Costly Sequential Experimentation and Project Valuation with an Application to Health Technology Assessment by Thijssen, Jacco Johan Jacob & Bregantini, Daniele
This is a repository copy of Costly Sequential Experimentation and Project Valuation with 
an Application to Health Technology Assessment.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/113052/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Thijssen, Jacco Johan Jacob orcid.org/0000-0001-6207-5647 and Bregantini, Daniele 
(2017) Costly Sequential Experimentation and Project Valuation with an Application to 
Health Technology Assessment. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control. pp. 202-229. 
ISSN 0165-1889 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2017.01.016
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
(CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long 
as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More 
information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Costly Sequential Experimentation and Project Valuation
with an Application to Health Technology Assessment
Jacco J.J. Thijssen
The York Management School
University of York
Freboys Lane
Heslington, York YO10 5GD, UK
Email: jacco.thijssen@york.ac.uk
Daniele Bregantini
University of Liverpool Management School
University of Liverpool
Chatham Street
Liverpool L69 7ZH, UK
Email: D.Bregantini@liverpool.ac.uk
December 16, 2016
Abstract
We study the optimal investment/abandonment decision for a project, where costly se-
quential experimentation provides information about its true proﬁtability. We derive the opti-
mal decision rule by appropriately extending the Bayesian framework of sequential hypothesis
testing. The optimal decision time takes the form of the ﬁrst exit time of a particular inaction
region. We ﬁnd that increased noise in the observations lowers the value of the project, and
that the effect on the expected time at which a decision is taken is ambiguous. Delays in obser-
vations affect both project value and the inaction region. The model is illustrated with a health
technology assessment application using data on standard versus robot-assisted laporascopic
prostatectomy.
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1 Introduction
Since its introduction by Myers (1977) and its textbook treatment by Dixit and Pindyck (1994),
the real options approach has been used in many ﬁelds of economics, ﬁnance, and management
to understand (investment) timing decisions and project valuation. The approach recognizes that
most investment projects are (partly) irreversible and subject to uncertainty. In this paper we
focus on a decision maker (DM) who knows the proﬁtability in various states of the world, but
faces uncertainty about this state. The uncertainty is resolved gradually through sequential ex-
perimentation in continuous time. Proﬁtability in the “good” state of the world gives an incentive
to invest if the DM is sufficiently sure that this state of the world prevails. The costs of sequential
experimentation give an incentive to abandon the project if the DM is sufficiently sure that the
“bad” state of the world prevails. Throughout, to keep matters concrete, we apply our model to
a typical health technology assessment (HTA) problem that relies on information obtained from a
clinical trial.
The paper extends the simplest model of sequential hypothesis testing with sampling costs,
ﬁrst developed by Wald (1947), analysed in a Bayesian set-up by Mikhalevich (1958) and further
developed by Shiryaev (1967)1, to a decision-theoretic setting that allows for comparisons with
standard real options models. This is done by extending the Shiryaev (1967) model to a case
where discounted expected payoffs are maximized, rather than non-discounted statistical losses
minimized.2 It turns out that these extensions are simple enough to allow for analytical results,
while being rich enough to allow for practically relevant and economically interesting conclu-
sions.
Sequential experimentation is modeled by assuming that the DM observes an arithmetic Brow-
nian motion with either a positive or zero trend; these are the two states of nature. The obser-
vations provide (costly) information about these states of nature.3 The DM wishes to ﬁnd the
optimal time to invest in or abandon an investment project. Optimality here is taken to mean
maximization of the discounted expected value of the project – the revenues and costs of which
depend on the state of nature in such a way that its net present value (NPV) is positive (negative)
in case the trend is positive (zero) – net of the costs of observations.
Like Shiryaev (1967) we can prove that there exists a unique solution to this problem (Sec-
1See also Shiryaev (1978, Section 4.2).
2The Shiryaev (1967) model does not allow for discounting.
3We argue in Section 3 that this set-up can be seen as the continuous-time limit of a simple sequentially conducted
clinical trial.
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tion 3) that depends only on the process measuring the posterior belief in the trend being positive.
This solution consists of a connected “inaction region” (Stokey, 2009) in the interior of the unit
interval. The upper boundary of this region represents the trigger beyond which investment is op-
timal, whereas the lower boundary represents the trigger below which abandonment is optimal.
We also obtain analytical results on comparative statics and the expected time until a decision is
taken (Section 4). In addition, we extend the model to include measurement delays (Section 5).
Such delays are of particular relevance to the case of HTA, where health beneﬁts of treatments are
typically only observed after signiﬁcant periods of time.
We ﬁnd that, ﬁrst, the investment (abandonment) trigger is decreasing (increasing) in the
volatility of the observations and that the value of the project decreases in volatility. These
ﬁndings are the exact opposite of standard ﬁndings in the real options literature (see Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994, Chapter 5 for a standard model). This is related to a difference in the source of un-
certainty. In the standard real options approach the costs and/or beneﬁts of a project are assumed
to be uncertain. By setting a higher adoption threshold and, thus, typically, waiting longer for
more information the decision-maker can lower the probability of erroneously adopting or aban-
doning the project. As a consequence higher uncertainty implies wider adoption/abandonment
bounds and a higher (option) value for the project. In our model, uncertainty enters as noise in
the (clinical trial) observations. There is no uncertainty over beneﬁts and costs conditional on the
true state of nature. Rather, the uncertainty is about the likelihood of each state of the world. This
means that if uncertainty increases (i.e. the observations become more noisy), then the value of
waiting for more information decreases. Consequently, the option value of the project is lower.
We show, numerically, that this does not necessarily mean that decisions are, in expectation, taken
sooner.
In addition, delays in observations have important consequences, both for the value of the
project as well as for the decision bounds. Observational delays are very important in practice, and
particularly in clinical trials where health beneﬁts of treatments can take years to be fully known.
In Section 5, we derive an explicit expression for the value function and show, numerically, that
the inaction region shrinks if the delay gets longer. In fact, we show that there may be cases where
the optimal decision rule is to take an immediate decision, irrespective of the prior. The reason
for this result is that, with delay, the present value of the trial’s cost before the ﬁrst observation
becomes available can outweigh the (more heavily discounted) informational beneﬁts of the trial.
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2 Related literature
Our paper is closely related to Kwon and Lipmann (2011), who use a similar stochastic set-up
to analyse a somewhat simpler decision theoretic model than that studied here. We extend their
results in several directions. First, we generalize the payoff structure of their model in two ways.
Whereas they study a “new market” model, our model allows for an upgrading of an existing
technology. In addition, our model can deal with both a decision theoretic as well as a purely sta-
tistical approach. The latter is still often used in the literature on clinical trials, so it is important
to show that such a model is a special case of our more general set-up. At a more technical level,
we obtain a slightly stronger result in that we prove uniqueness, rather than mere existence, of the
investment/abandonment triggers. Secondly, in contrast to our model, Kwon and Lipmann (2011)
assume that the observation of signals is costless. Thirdly, we provide more detailed analytical re-
sults on comparative statics. Finally, we extend their model to study the case, important in ﬁelds
like health technology assessment, where results of experiments are observed with a delay.
Another closely related paper is Moscarini and Smith (2001), who model an experiment the
volatility of which can be continuously inﬂuenced by the DM. This is modeled by assuming that
at any time t the DM can decide how many observations to draw. In our model we have ﬁxed
this number to one. The main advantage of this lack of ﬂexibility is that we are able to derive
analytical comparative statics results. Also, in clinical trials the experimenter usually does not
have the freedom to choose how long treatment per patient is going to take, so that the assumption
of a ﬁxed number of observations over a given time interval is not unrealistic.
Sequential hypothesis testing and bandit problems
There is a close link between the learning that happens in models of sequential hypothesis testing
and multi-arm bandits. The latter are used in situations where agents try to optimise their pay-
offs while simultaneously gathering more information about a risky alternative to a safe option.
Learning only takes place when the risky option is chosen. These models, therefore, analyse the
trade-off between maximizing the current reward and the value of getting more precise informa-
tion about the future reward. Typically, the decision maker can choose between using a “safe”
arm, or a “risky” arm. By playing the safe arm, the agent receives an immediate payoff (initially
usually lower in expectation than when playing the safe arm), but, as the process continues, the
payoffs of the risky arm evolve and the player gathers more information about the distribution of
returns from the risky arm. In the economics literature, bandits have been used to model search
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processes (see Rothschild (1974) and Bergemann and Valimaki (2006) for an overview), learning
and matching in markets such as the labour and consumer markets (see Jovanovic (1979), Sun-
daram (2005) and Arlotto et al. (2014)) and agent experimentation (see Bolton and Harris (1999),
Keller et al. (2005), (Keller and Rady, 2010) and Heiodhues et al. (2015)).
An example of a typical bandit model is provided by Bolton and Harris (1999), who analyse
a game where players have to determine, continuously, the intensity with which a safe and risky
arm are used. In fact, our informational set-up is similar to theirs and their cooperative bench-
mark is quite close to our model. The main differences are that the decision-maker in our model
does not get any payoffs until a decision about which arm to use is chosen (here choosing the safe
arm could be interpreted as abandoning the project), that experimentation is costly, and that the
decision to stop sampling involves sunk costs. In addition, the model by Bolton and Harris (1999)
allows the decision-maker to continuously adjust the intensity with which each arm is played. In
that sense, their model is more like an optimal portfolio problem, rather than an optimal stop-
ping problem. So, while the modeling of learning in bandit problems is closely related to that of
sequential hypothesis testing, the focus and, hence, the mathematical tools to analyse such prob-
lems are substantially different.4 In particular, dynamic programming models, where the goal is
the continuous optimization of a certain performance criterion ﬂow, are solved by selecting an
appropriate feedback policy (and corresponding value function). Optimal stopping, in contrast,
deals with selecting a stopping time to achieve a set purpose. Optimal stopping arises naturally
in situations when the timing of the decision is crucial (e.g., determining when it is optimal to sell
a stock). The “bang-bang” solution, where a trigger determines the switch from one arm to the
other, obtained in the cooperative benchmark of Bolton and Harris (1999) is the optimal decision
rule in a large class of feedback rules. In our model, the decision rule must be a stopping time.
In summary, the results of bandit and optimal stopping problems may look very similar (i.e., the
DM acts when a certain trigger is reached), the DM’s objective is different and, thus, is the solution
method.
In a clinical trial setting, the Bolton and Harris (1999) model could be interpreted as follows.
At each point in time a patient enters the trial and the decision maker uses a mixed strategy to
determine if the patient gets the placebo (safe arm) or the new drug (risky arm). The crucial
difference between this set-up and ours is that the mixed strategy of the decision-maker changes
4Keller et al. (2005) and Keller and Rady (2010), in a similar set-up to Bolton and Harris (1999), study a game of
strategic experimentation where the risky arm distributes lump-sum payoffs according to a continuous time Poisson
process, rather than a model based on Brownian motion.
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over time in light of the evidence. Studying clinical trials in this way moves quite far from current
practice, as the objective of the Bolton and Harris (1999) model is to maximize expected payoffs
during the trial, rather than trying to learn as quickly as possible what decision (adoption or aban-
donment) should be taken. In particular, the Bolton and Harris (1999) could not be implemented
alongside current or past clinical trials, whereas our approach can.
In the clinical trial interpretation of our model, we stay closer to real-world trials where two
patients enter the trial at each time, one being given the placebo and one being given the new drug.
Experimentation is then undertaken continuously until the optimal stopping time. It is only at
this point that the decision maker chooses either for abandonment or adoption of the technol-
ogy and obtain some pre-speciﬁed payoff. The abandonment option is typically not analysed in
the bandit literature. An important feature of our model is that the adoption and abandonment
bounds have to be determined simultaneously, which implies that the option values for abandon-
ment and adoption are interdependent. We show in a comparative static exercise (Section 4) how
the bounds vary when changing a number of parameters. It turns out that varying parameters
that directly drive the statistical evidence process (e.g., volatility or mean expected net beneﬁt
of the technology) brings about symmetric changes in the decision bounds in the sense that they
both widen or both shrink the inaction region. This is due to the fact that both adoption and aban-
donment payoffs are functions of the posterior process. On the other hand, we show that varying
parameters that enter only the payoffs, but not the evidential process (e.g., the expected beneﬁt
from adoption if the technology is superior), moves the decision bounds in the same direction,
i.e., they both increase or they both decrease. The effect on the inaction region is then ambiguous.
This is to be expected as the balance of the adoption and rejection payoffs is changing in favour of
one over the other. So, our model provides some novel insights that may also be of interest to the
bandit literature.
Health technology assessment and sequential analysis
While our model can be applied to many investment projects with costly experimentation we
choose to focus in this paper on clinical trials. One advantage is that it makes it easier to see the
practical relevance of the model. Secondly, sequential methods, in the form of group-sequential
analysis have long been applied to the ﬁeld of medical statistics, albeit typically in discrete time.5
Recently, due to the escalating costs of drug development and testing, there has been great in-
terest in early stopping in clinical trials with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issuing
5Among the many references, only the seminal work by Armitage (1975) and Berry (1985) are mentioned here.
6
non-binding guidance for such study designs (FDA, 2010). Additionally, clinical trials evaluating
medicines, medical devices and procedures have also seen, due to changes in regulatory reim-
bursement requirements of many health care systems, the explicit assessment of economic value
of these interventions (Ramsey et al., 2005).
While randomized clinical trials are traditionally considered to be the gold standard for de-
termining the safety and efficacy of health-care interventions (Spiegelhalter et al., 2004) and their
outcomes largely determine whether new health-care technologies are approved by regulatory
agencies, governments have become increasingly concerned about the value for money of such
technologies. In fact, even if a technology displays superior efficacy in a controlled environment
such as a clinical trial, there still remains the question of its cost-effectiveness. In this context, the
example of health technology assessment is topical. In particular, especially for those interven-
tions that display immediate effects, it is now more common for cost-effectiveness evaluations to
be conducted alongside clinical trials (Meltzer and Smith, 2012)
In clinical research, typical adoption/abandonment/postponenment decisions take place after
enough evidence has been provided to pass a purely inferential evidence threshold (usually stated,
explicitly or implicitly, in terms of a p-value). However, such traditional sample size calculations
tend to be based on arbitrary rules of inference, typically Type I and Type II error probabilities,
and do not reﬂect the cost of making such errors (William and Pinto, 2005). Recently, Montaz-
erhodjat and Lo (2015) emphasised that the traditional approach to inference can bring about
thresholds that are too conservative and lead to ”overly large” trials (Berry, 2006) and long ap-
proval processes for drugs intended to treat serious conditions (FDA, 2006, 2013). They suggest
to incorporate the patient’s perspective when calculating trials’ sample sizes and critical values
for a ﬁxed-sample design. In particular, in their Bayesian framework emphasis is given to the
number of patients affected by a disease and disease severity.
Motivated by the recent changes in health-care technologies approval requirements and in-
creased criticism of standard inferential rules for clinical trials’ design, our model seeks to com-
bine the statistical evidence gathered during clinical research with cost-effectiveness analysis in
order to obtain optimal economic decisions. Since the decision rule (implicitly) used in tradi-
tional inference is a special case of the decision rules that we allow, our approach is superior in
terms of expected net beneﬁts. However, while our model is mainly aimed at providing a dynamic
cost-beneﬁt analysis, it is rich enough to model purely inferential concerns of the type mentioned
above.
Our decision framework is linked to a recent line of research that argues for the explicit in-
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clusion of uncertainty and sunk costs. Palmer and Smith (2000), for example, apply the Dixit and
Pindyck (1994) real options approach to the adjustment (under a certain degree of irreversibil-
ity and uncertainty) of the incremental cost-effectiveness ratio for a drug. Driffield and Smith
(2007) use real options to argue for a watchful waiting regime for diseases with slow progression.
Forster and Pertile (2013) appeal to real options to argue that ﬂexibility and irreversibility of ac-
tions should play a much bigger role in HTA than they are hitherto assigned. However, presently
the real options approach has not been implemented in any systematic way (Meltzer and Smith,
2012).
Closely related to our work is Pertile et al. (2014), who view adoption, treatment and research
decisions as a single economic project, and argue that the dynamic approach to HTA can provide
efficiency gains in resource allocation. Their approach, however, is one of sequential estimation,
whereas ours is one of sequential hypothesis testing. The advantage of our hypothesis testing ap-
proach is that it “dichotomizes” the decision (Draper, 2013). While Draper (2013) argues that this
is unnecessary, it is precisely this assumption that allows us to derive many analytical properties,
even in a more complicated case with delayed observations. Papers without this feature, such
as, for example, Hampson and Jennison (2013) or Chick et al. (2015), typically have to resort to
numerical solutions. In short, what we lose in realism we gain in analytical clarity.
3 The Model and Main Result
Consider a decision-maker (DM) who is observing costly signals in continuous time about the
proﬁtability of an investment project. The proﬁtability depends on the state of the world, θ,
which can be “good” (θ = 1) or “bad” (θ = 0). To make matters concrete, we model a DM who
has to value a new health technology and observes the outcomes of an ongoing clinical trial in
which patients are treated sequentially. In order to make a decision about adopting or abandoning
the new technology, the DM needs to carefully consider the beneﬁts and costs of each decision,
conditional on the events {θ = 1} and {θ = 0}. We require that beneﬁts and and costs are all
measured in monetary units.6 We introduce the following quantities, all of which are assumed to
be known ex ante by the DM:
• B1 > 0: the net beneﬁt of the new health technology if θ = 1;
• B0 ≥ 0: the net beneﬁt of the new health technology if θ = 0;
6In the UK, for example, health beneﬁts are usually measured in quality adjusted life years (QALYs), which allows
for comparison between different health technologies.
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• B ≥ 0: the net beneﬁt of the existing health technology;
• I > 0: the sunk costs of investing in the new health technology;
• c > 0: per period cost of running the clinical trial;
• L ≥ 0: the loss of not using the new technology if θ = 1;
• P ≥ 0: per period penalty, incurred during the trial, of not using the new health technology
if θ = 1.
Remark 1. In a purely economic decision theoretic framework, where proﬁts and losses, rather than
statistical errors are the focus of the analysis, we will typically set P = L = 0. However, our framework
can also be used in a purely statistical setting. In that case, I represents the loss of a Type I error and L
denotes the loss of a Type II error. If one sets B0 = B = P = 0 and B1 = I , then a standard (Bayesian)
statistical decision theoretic model appears.
Remark 2. The last term, P , represents a penalty for not using a new health technology during the trial
that is, in fact, better than the existing technology. It has been argued in the literature (Palmer and
Smith, 2000) that this should be taken into account explicitly in health technology assessment, because
payoffs in an HTA exercise are not just reﬂecting “proﬁts” and “losses”, but represent human lives.
Any patient who is outside the trial (and those in the trial but not enrolled in the arm with the new
technology) effectively misses out on the incremental beneﬁts related to the new technology (conditional
on it being superior) leading to a loss to the heath-care system. This loss cumulates until the new
technology is adopted (and will continue to accumulate if a superior technology is abandoned). A recent
report explicitly mentions that “[d]elayed adoption leads to loss of health beneﬁts to patients who might
have beneﬁted from earlier access to technologies which prove to be cost-effective” (YHEC, 2009, p. 5).
As this is a controversial issue and no consensus exists in the literature, we will typically set P = 0 in
numerical examples. The payoffs B1, B, B, and L will be in terms of discounted present values over the
life-time of the technology being used on the entire population of patients.
In terms of parameter restrictions it is appropriate to assume that B0 − I < B ≤ B1 − I , so that
the new technology outperforms the current technology if, and only if, the state of the world is
θ = 1. Table 1 summarises the payoffs of investment and abandonment under different states of
the world.
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State of the world
θ = 1 θ = 0
Decision
Adoption B1 − I B0 − I
Abandonment B− L B
Table 1: Payoffmatrix of a health technology decision problem.
If the DM takes a decision at time t, when the (posterior) belief in the event {θ = 1} is πt ∈ (0,1),
the expected net present value of adoption/investment, denoted by FI , is
FI (πt) : = πt(B1 − I ) + (1−πt)(B0 − I )
= πt(B1 −B0) +B0 − I .
(1)
Similarly, if at time t the decision maker decides to abandon the new health technology, then the
expected net present value is
FA(πt) : = πt(B− L) + (1−πt)B
= B−πtL.
(2)
So, at time t the DM will choose to invest if, and only if,
πt > π¯ ≡
B+ I −B0
B1 +L−B0
. (3)
Note that B1 > B + I > B0 implies that π¯ > 0. The problem is only interesting if π¯ < 1 (otherwise
investment is never optimal), i.e. if
B1 − I > B− L.
That is, the net payoff of investing in the new health technology if θ = 1 must exceed the payoff of
the current treatment net of the loss that is incurred if θ = 1 and the new technology is not used.
Until a decision is taken, the decision maker is assumed to incur a per-period cost, c > 0, for
conducting a clinical trial and a per-period penalty, P, for not using the new technology in case
θ = 1. Assuming that all payoffs and costs are discounted at a constant rate r > 0, the decision
maker therefore needs to ﬁnd a stopping time τ∗ that solves the optimal stopping problem
F∗(π) = supτ∈T Eπ
[
−
∫ τ
0
e−rt(c +πtP)dt + e−rτmax{FI (πτ),FA(πτ)}
]
= Eπ
[
−
∫ τ∗
0
e−rt(c +πtP)dt + e−rτ
∗
max {FI (πτ∗),FA(πτ∗)}
]
,
(4)
where T is the set of all stopping times with respect to an appropriate ﬁltration deﬁned below.
10
Remark 3. The penalty of not using a superior technology during the running of the clinical trial is
here assumed to be a linear function of the posterior belief in a superior technology. This restriction
to linearity is not necessary. For the proof of Proposition 1 below, a more general penalty function,
P : (0,1) → R+, which is increasing, convex and satisﬁes P(1) > 0, would be valid. For the model
with delays in measurement that is discussed in Section 5, however, linearity makes the argument much
simpler. For that reason we will restrict ourselves to a linear penalty function in the remainder.
The clinical trial provides information about the true state of nature and is used to obtain the
posterior process (πt)t≥0. We view the optimal stopping problem (4) as one of Bayesian sequential
testing of two simple hypotheses in continuous time. We use the formalization by Shiryaev (1978)
as the starting point of our model. As in his setup we assume that uncertainty is modeled on
a probability space (Ω,F ,Pp) for a family of probability measures (Pp)p∈[0,1], and that, for ﬁxed
p ∈ [0,1], we are given a random variable θ˜, representing the true state of the world and taking
values in {0,1}.7 For p ∈ (0,1), the probability measure Pp is obtained as
Pp = pP1 + (1− p)P0,
where P1 and P0 are degenerate distributions with P1(θ˜ = 1) = P0(θ˜ = 0) = 1.
On this probability space we construct a continuous-time model of a sequential clinical trial.
Before introducing the model in continuous time, we build one in discrete time, to illustrate the
main ideas. Consider a time interval [0, t], for some ﬁxed t > 0. During this time, assume that
we observe the outcomes of the trial sequentially at n equally spaced occasions dt = t/n, i.e., at
times {0 = t0, t1, . . . , tn = t}. The outcome of a clinical trial at time ti is measured in terms of the
cumulative beneﬁt (often measured relative to some existing technology) to the patients in the trial
and is denoted by Xi . We assume that observations consist of a signal and a noise component
and that both components depend on the time interval between observations. This reﬂects the
idea that more patients will be treated during longer time intervals. To keep things as simple as
possible, the noise component is assumed to be binary, which implies that between times ti−1 and
ti the observed cumulative beneﬁt either goes up by a factor U , or down by a factor D, both with
equal probability. In particular, it is assumed that
U = θµdt +σ
√
dt, and D = θµdt −σ
√
dt.
Here σ measures the magnitude of the noise component, and µmeasures the expected cumulative
beneﬁt per unit of time conditional on the new technology being superior. The total accumulated
beneﬁt at time t after n steps is equal to X(n)(t) :=
∑n
i=1Xi .
7Since we use a Bayesian framework, the parameter θ is assumed to be the realization of a random variable θ˜.
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In order to obtain analytical results, we move to the continuous-time limit of this simple
model. For ﬁxed t, we do this by increasing the number of time steps at which evidence is ob-
served. To that effect, deﬁne Xt := limn→∞X(n)(t), where the limit is understood to be in dis-
tribution.8 According to the central limit theorem (CLT), the conditional distribution of Xt is
well-deﬁned and is given by
Xt |θ ∼ N(θµt,σ2t).
The only continuous-time stochastic process X := (Xt)t≥0, that gives these distributions at each
ﬁnite time t is the arithmetic Brownian motion (ABM)
Xt = θµt +σBt .
Here (Bt)t≥0 is a standard Pp-Brownian motion, and p and 1− p play the role of prior probabilities
of the statistical hypotheses
H0 : θ = 0, and H1 : θ = 1,
respectively.
Remark 4. Applying the CLT in deriving the limit distribution of Xt only gives point-wise convergence
for ﬁxed t. A fairly straightforward application of Donsker’s Invariance Principle (see, for example,
Steele, 2001, Theorem 5.4) shows that for all x ∈R,
lim
n→∞P
(
X(n)(·) ≤ x
)
= P (X(·) ≤ x) .
Apart from theoretical importance, this result is of practical interest as it shows that the continuous-time
model is a limiting case of a discrete-time model, the latter more likely being an accurate description in
real-world applications.
Since we interpret the observations X as being obtained from a clinical trial, the parameter
µ represents the cumulative health beneﬁts of the new technology. In many cases, this will be
a beneﬁt relative to some existing technology that is to be expected in one time unit of trials
conditional on the new health technology being superior. What is understood by “superior” can
depend on the particular application. For example, one could compute the per patient break-
even incremental beneﬁt of the new health technology over the best existing treatment net of its
additional cost. The parameter µ then equals this net beneﬁt multiplied by the number of patients
treated in the trial during a year. The parameter σ is a measure of the standard deviation due to
8Note that n→∞ implies that dt ↓ 0.
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random effects on health beneﬁts from patient to patient. Another approach would be to apply
the concept of “clinically important differences” as introduced by Samsa et al. (1999).
The process (Xt)t≥0 generates the ﬁltration FX = (F
X
t )t≥0, which is augmented with the Pp-
null sets. The set of FX -stopping times is denoted by T . For all t ≥ 0, the Radon-Nikodym
derivative
Λt :=
d(P1 |FXt )
d(P0 |FXt )
,
deﬁnes the likelihood ratio process (Λt)t≥0. Shiryaev (1978) shows that the process (Λt)t≥0 admits
the representation
Λt = exp
( µ
σ2
(
Xt −
µ
2
t
))
, t ≥ 0.9
The posterior process (πt)t≥0, with πt = Pp(θ˜ = 1 | FXt ), can be obtained as a function of the
likelihood ratio process using Bayes’ rule:
πt =
(
p
1− pΛt
)/(
1+
p
1− pΛt
)
.
From Ito’s lemma it then immediately follows that (πt)t≥0 solves the stochastic differential equa-
tion
dπt =
µ
σ
πt(1−πt)dB¯t , with π0 = p, Pp-a.s., (5)
where
(
B¯t
)
t≥0, with
B¯t :=
1
σ
(
Xt −µ
∫ t
0
πsds
)
, (6)
is a standard Pp-Brownian motion, called the innovation process. The process (πt)t≥0 is time-
homogeneous and strongly Markovian under Pp. Note that, since F
π = FX , the set of Fπ-
stopping times is T , so that problem (4) is well-deﬁned.
With this sequential model of a clinical trial in hand we can solve the optimal stopping prob-
lem (4). In Proposition 1 below, we show that the state space (0,1) can be split into three regions.
The ﬁrst one is a region around π¯ where continuation of the trial is optimal, thence called the
continuation region, and denoted by
C = {π ∈ (0,1)|F∗(π) >max(FA(π),FI (π))} = (πA,πI ),
where πA and πI , with 0 < πA < π¯ < πI < 1, are the abandonment and investment triggers, respec-
tively. When π gets large enough we enter the investment region, where adoption of the health-care
9From Ito’s lemma it follows that, conditional on θ, the process (Λt )t≥0 follows the geometric Brownian motion
(GBM) dΛ
Λ
= θ
µ2
σ2
dt +
µ
σ dB.
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technology is optimal. This region is denoted by
DI = {π ∈ (0,1)|F∗(π) = FI (π)} = [πI ,1).
Conversely, when π gets low enough, we enter the abandonment region, where abandoning the
clinical trial is optimal. This region is denoted by
DA = {π ∈ (0,1)|F∗(π) = FA(π)} = (0,πA].
In order to derive the value function F∗ in (4), henceforth called the value of the new technology,
we introduce the parameter
γ :=
1
2
√
1+4r
(
σ
µ
)2
>
1
2
,
and, for given 0 < πA < πI < 1, the functions νˆπA,πI : [πA,πI ]→ [0,1] and νˇπA,πI : [πA,πI ]→ [0,1],
deﬁned by
νˆπA,πI (π) :=
√
π(1−π)
πI (1−πI )
(
1−πA
πA
π
1−π
)γ − ( πA1−πA 1−ππ )γ(
1−πA
πA
πI
1−πI
)γ − ( πA1−πA 1−πIπI )γ ,
and
νˇπA,πI (π) :=
√
π(1−π)
πA(1−πA)
(
1−π
π
πI
1−πI
)γ − ( π1−π 1−πIπI )γ(
1−πA
πA
πI
1−πI
)γ − ( πA1−πA 1−πIπI )γ ,
respectively. In Appendix A we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose that
1. B1 −B0 +P/r > 0,
2. L−P/r ≥ 0,
3. B > B0 − I ,
4. B1 − I > B− L, and
5. B+ c/r > π¯
γ+1/2
π¯+γ−1/2 (L−P/r).
Then there exist unique thresholds πA and πI , πA < π¯ < πI , such that the optimal stopping time is the
ﬁrst exit time of (πA,πI ), i.e.
τ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0|πt < (πA,πI )}.
14
In addition, the value of the new health technology, if the posterior belief in {θ˜ = 1} is π, equals
F∗(π) =

FA(π) if π ≤ πA
−
(
c
r
+π
P
r
)
+ νˆπA,πI (π)
(
FI (πI ) +
c
r
+πI
P
r
)
+ νˇπA,πI (π)
(
FA(πA) +
c
r
+πA
P
r
) if πA < π < πI
FI (π) if π ≥ πI .
(7)
The triggers πA and πI are the unique values for which (7) is C
1 for all π ∈ (0,1).
Remark 5. The ﬁrst four conditions in Proposition 1 are fairly natural parameter restrictions to ensure
that the net present value functions of adoption and abandonment are well-behaved. Condition 5, how-
ever, may be too strong for certain applications. It can be relaxed to a condition that is more difficult to
check and requires more notation; the proof of Proposition 1 gives more details. Note that, in the fairly
natural case where L = P/r, the ﬁnal condition is always satisﬁed.
For π ∈ (πA,πI ), the values νˆπA,πI (π) and νˇπA,πI (π) are the expected discount factors of ﬁrst
reaching πI and πA, respectively, given the current posterior probability π. So, if we denote the
ﬁrst hitting times of πI and πA from C by τˆ(πI ) and τˇ(πA), respectively, then
νˆπA,πI (π) = Eπ
[
e−rτˆ(πI ); τˆ(πI ) < τˇ(πA)
]
, (8)
and
νˇπA,πI (π) = Eπ
[
e−rτˇ(πA); τˆ(πI ) > τˇ(πA)
]
. (9)
In the region C = (πA,πI ) the value of the project is, therefore, equal to the cost of running
the trial forever and never taking a decision, corrected for the expected net value of adopting or
abandoning the health technology at the ﬁrst time C is exited, at πI or πA, respectively, discounted
back to the current time using the expected discount factor.
4 Comparative Statics
In this section we investigate the sensitivity of the solution to (4) with respect to some of the
model’s parameters.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the conditions of Proposition 1 hold. Let τ∗ = inf{t ≥ 0|πt < (πA,πI )} be
the unique solution to (4). It then holds that
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B = 30 B0 = 40 B1 = 60
I = 20 c = 3
L = 0 P = 0
(a) Payoffs
r = .1 µ = 2 σ = 1
p = .5
(b) Parameter values
Table 2: Parameter values for a base-case numerical example.
• πA is increasing and πI is decreasing in the cost of the trial, c;
• both πA and πI are decreasing in the beneﬁts of the technology if superior, B1;
• both πA and πI are increasing in the beneﬁts of the current technology, B;
• πA is increasing and πI is decreasing in the volatility, σ , provided that πA < 1/2 < πI ;
• πA is decreasing and πI is increasing in the expected beneﬁts in the trial (conditional on θ = 1),
µ, provided that πA < 1/2 < πI .
The proof of this proposition can be found in Appendix B.
In order to assess the quantitative effects on the bounds, the ex ante (prior) value of the new
technology, F∗(p), the expected time until a decision is made, and the expected costs of the trial,
we conduct a numerical analysis. The payoffs and parameters for a base-case scenario are given
in Table 2. For this case it turns out that πA = 19.99% and πI = 79.44%.
10 For different values of
the posterior belief in the event {θ˜ = 1} the value of the new technology is depicted in Figure 1a.
This ﬁgure shows the value of waiting, for beliefs between the thresholds πA and πI . Note that
this value represents both the upside of the potential beneﬁts if the new technology turns out to
be superior as well as the downside of ﬁnding out that the new technology is not superior.
For each π ∈ (πA,πI ) the probabilities of investment and abandonment can actually be com-
puted explicitly as (see, for example, Poor and Hadjiliadis, 2009)
π −πA
πI −πA
, and
πI −π
πI −πA
,
respectively. For the base-case scenario these probabilities of investment and abandonment are
depicted in Figure 1b. The investment probability is linearly increasing, because it becomes more
likely that πI is reached before πA as the posterior belief in {θ˜ = 1} increases. The probability of
an abandonment decision, consequently, goes in the other direction.
10All calculations are executed in Matlab.
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Figure 1: Value of technology and decision probabilities for base-case scenario.
Note that the expected cost of the trial is given by
Ep
[∫ τ∗
0
ce−rtdt
]
=
c
r
(
1− Ep
[
e−rτ
∗])
=
c
r
(
1− νˆπA,πI (p)− νˇπA,πI (p)
)
.
Note that Ep
[
e−rτ∗
]
and Ep[τ
∗] do not necessarilymove in the same direction. The latter expectation
equals
Eπ[τ
∗] =
2σ2
µ2
{
log
[(
π
1−π
)1−2π(1−πA
πA
)1−2πA]
+
π −πA
πI −πA
log
[(
πA
1−πA
)1−2πA(1−πI
πI
)1−2πI ]}
.
(10)
The derivation of this expectation is standard (see, for example, Poor and Hadjiliadis, 2009).
The comparative statics for the noise in the clinical trial, σ , are given in Figure 2. From a
real options perspective, these appear to be counterintuitive as they show that project value is
lower for higher levels of noise. This is the opposite effect found in the real options literature,
where more uncertainty increases the value. The reason for this difference lies in the nature of the
uncertainty. Here, if σ increases, we are paying to keep a trial alive that provides less information.
That means that waiting leads to less precise information, which makes waiting less valuable. As
the trial is costly, one might as well decide sooner. In other words, the costs of waiting (conducting
more trials) do not outweigh the beneﬁts (the extra evidence accruing from the trials), because the
trials are less informative. The effect of σ on the expected length of the trial and its expected costs
is ambiguous. This happens because of two opposing effects. On the one hand, a higher volatility
makes the trial less informative leading to an increasing trial length. On the other hand, the
decision bounds narrow, which implies a decision is reached earlier. The relative weight of these
effects changes as σ is increased.
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Figure 2: Comparative statics for σ .
Recall that the parameter µ measures the expected net beneﬁt of the new technology in the
trial over a unit of time, conditional on it being superior. This implies that µ and B1 are closely
related. In fact, these two parameters should only differ in so far as that B1 refers to the population
of treated patients after approval, whereas µ refers to the patients treated in the trial. Here we
keep the beneﬁts B1 constant, so we are, implicitly assuming that we are treating more patients
at the same cost in the trial. The comparative statics for the parameter µ are depicted in Figure 3.
It should not come as a surprise that the adoption/abandonment bounds get wider, because, ce-
teris paribus, the trial becomes more informative (relative to the noise component). This increases
the value of waiting for more information and, thus, the value of the new technology. The non-
monotonicity in the expected time until a decision is taken follows from a similar reason as we
identiﬁed for σ . On the one hand, we get more information per time period, which leads to deci-
sions being taken sooner. On the other hand, because the value of waiting for more information
increases, we want to make a decision later (the decision bounds widen).
The inﬂuence of the annual cost of conducting the trial, c, are given in Figure 4. These are as
to be expected: the higher the costs of the trial the closer the thresholds are together, the lower
the value of the technology, and the sooner, on average, a decision is taken. Here we see that only
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Figure 3: Comparative statics for µ.
the expected costs of the trial are non-monotonic. This happens because there are two opposing
factors at work. On the one hand a decision is taken sooner, which lowers the expected costs. On
the other hand, the per-period costs increase, which makes the expected costs higher.
The effects of the beneﬁts of the new technology if superior, B1, are clear-cut and are reported
in Figure 5. The decision bounds are decreasing and initially widen, but from B1 ≈ 72 start
narrowing again. This explains the non-monotonicity of the expected length and costs of trials,
because B1 does not inﬂuence the properties of the posterior process.
Even though it is analytically clear that both decision bounds are increasing in the beneﬁts of
the existing technology, B, Figure 6 shows that the inaction region ﬁrst widens and then narrows.
Also note that for small values of B a prior of p = .5 leads to immediate investment and, hence,
no trial being started at all. Since B does not inﬂuence the prior expected net-present value of
adoption, the value function is ﬂat in this region. Conversely, for large values of B an immediate
decision to abandon is taken, simply because the expected net increase in beneﬁts if the new
technology turns out to be superior over the the old technology are too small to warrant starting
a trial. The non-monotonicities in expected trial length and costs are not surprising in this light:
the decision bounds ﬁrst widen and then narrow and since B does not inﬂuence the properties of
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Figure 4: Comparative statics for c.
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Figure 5: Comparative statics for B1.
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Figure 6: Comparative statics for B.
the posterior process this means that we ﬁrst wait longer and then start taking decisions sooner.
Finally, in Figure 7 we depict the inﬂuence of the prior, p, on the expected time to decision
and the expected trial costs. Note that the prior has no inﬂuence on the investment/abandonment
thresholds, so that we can refer to Figure 1b for comparative statics of the ex ante investment/abandonment
probabilities. Figure 7 illustrates a simple intuition: the vaguer the a priori information about the
efficacy of the technology, the longer it will take, on average, before a decision is taken and the
more, on average, it will cost to obtain enough information to make that decision. Obviously, the
prior is vaguest at p = 1/2.
5 Delays in Measurement
An important issue in measuring health beneﬁts as part of a clinical trial is that these are typically
not observed instantaneously but, rather, with a delay. This issue has recently been investigated
by Chick et al. (2015) who use a Bayesian sequential estimation method. Unlike their approach,
in our sequential testing framework, incorporating delays in observations can be achieved as a
straightforward extension of the basic model by following the approach introduced in Øksendal
(2004).
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Figure 7: Comparative statics for p.
Suppose that the delay in information becoming available is denoted by δ > 0. Thus, at time t
the decision maker observes the information of the patient who entered the trial at time t − δ. If
we insist on decision rules not being anticipating, the decision maker has to restrict herself to the
set Tδ of delayed stopping times, i.e. functions τδ : Ω → [0,∞] such that {ω ∈Ω | τδ(ω) ≤ t } ∈ Ft−δ,
for all t ≥ δ. That is, if at time t the DM stops the trial, the last patient’s treatment starts at time t.
When the results of that patient come in, at time t + δ, the DM decides to invest or abandon.
The value of the project now equals
F∗δ(π) := sup
τδ∈Tδ
Eπ
[
−
∫ τδ
0
e−rt(c +Pπt)dt + e−rτδ max
{
FA(πτδ ),FI (πτδ )
}]
. (11)
Note that F∗0(π) = F
∗(π), cf. (7). We can prove the following result (for the proof see Appendix C).
Proposition 3. If the optimal stopping problem (11) has a solution, then the continuation region has
the form (πδA,π
δ
I ), for some constants 0 < π
δ
A < π
δ
I < 1. The optimal stopping time is τ
∗
δ = inf{t ≥ 0|πt <
(πδA,π
δ
I )}+ δ. Moreover, for every δ > 0 and π ∈ (πδA,πδI ) the value of the project is given by
F∗δ(π) = −
(
c
r
+π
P
r
)
+ νˆπδA,π
δ
I
(π)Fδ(π
δ
I ) + νˇπδA,π
δ
I
(π)Fδ(π
δ
A),
where
Fδ(π) ≡ e−rδ
{
c +Pπ
r
+ (B1 −B0)πΦ(b+)− LπΦ(d−)
+ (B0 − I )[πΦ(b+) + (1−π)Φ(b−)] +B[πΦ(d−) + (1−π)Φ(d+)]
}
,
b± =
σ
µ
√
δ
[
log
(
(1− π¯)π
π¯(1−π)
)
± 1
2
µ2
σ2
δ
]
, d± =
σ
µ
√
δ
[
log
(
(1−π)π¯
π(1− π¯)
)
± 1
2
µ2
σ2
δ
]
,
Φ is the cdf of the standard normal distribution, and νˆ and νˇ are the expected discount factors deﬁned
in (8) and (9), respectively. The triggers πδA and π
δ
I are such that F
∗
δ is C
1 on (0,1).
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Figure 8: Net present values of an immediate decision (left-panel) and probabilities of adoption
upon stopping (right-panel) for different values of δ. The parameter values are taken as in Table 2.
The function Fδ is, in a sense a probability-weighted average of FI and FA, delayed by δ, but
computed at the time the trial is stopped. The DM knows that, when she stops the trial, she will
make a decision in δ units of time. She will then adopt (abandon) if, at that time, the posterior
exceeds (is below) π¯. At the time she decides to stop admitting patients to the trial, she can
compute the probabilities of these events, as well as the expectations of the posterior, conditional
on these events. See Appendix C for details.
Figure 8 shows the net present value of an immediate adoption/abandonment decision for
different values of the delay parameter δ. Note that the NPV is not unambiguously point-wise
increasing or decreasing in δ, but that for small and large values of the posterior, the effect of
delay is unambiguous: the longer the delay in observations, the lower the NPV. The right-panel
of Figure 8 shows the probability of adoption after δ periods as a function of the posterior belief
in a superior technology at the time of stopping the trial. Note that for δ = 0 this probability is
degenerate: 1 if π > π¯ and 0 if π < π¯. When δ > 0 the probability of adoption is increasing in the
posterior at the time the trial is stopped. For values π > π¯, the probability of adoption is higher for
smaller values of δ, as is intuitively clear. For values π < π¯, the probability of adoption is higher
for longer delays. This happens because the variance of the distribution of πδ is larger for larger
values of δ. This gives a higher probability of bigger increases over the time interval [0,δ]. Since
at the moment the trial is stopped the DM expects to abandon (because π < π¯), a longer time delay
essentially means taking a gamble with a larger upside.
Figure 9 shows the value function for the base-case in Table 2 with no delay (left-panel) and
a delay of 0.1 years (right-panel). The value with delay is obviously lower than with delay, for
every level of posterior belief in a superior technology (at the moment of stopping the trial). It
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Figure 9: Project value with no delay (left-panel) and positive delay (right-panel). The parameter
values are taken as in Table 2.
also appears that the continuation region (πδA,π
δ
A) is narrower with delay. This is conﬁrmed by
a numerical calculation of the bounds, which gives a continuation region of (.2063, .7860). The
intuition for this result is clear: upon stopping there is another period of length δ over which new
observations become available and during which costs of sampling are incurred. As a result the
DM can stop the trial earlier and take a gamble on what the observations over the period δ are
going to tell her. Obviously this brings extra risk and, thus, a lower value of the project.
The narrowing of the continuation region as a function of the delay δ is also conﬁrmed by a
comparative statics analysis, as shown in Figure 10. We can also see that the value of the project
is monotonically decreasing in δ. The non-monotonicity of the expected time to stopping the trial
and the expected costs of the trial follows from the fact that on the one hand there is a reduction
in the expected time of the trial, because a decision is taken sooner, while, on the other hand, the
trial duration is extended by δ. Since the effect on the expected time until a decision is taken is
non-linear, the combined effect is non-monotonic.
Remark 6. The existence of a solution to (11) depends, ﬁrstly, on the existence of a solution to the
equations
νˆ ′
πδA,π
δ
I
(πδA)Fδ(π
δ
I ) + νˇ
′
πδA,π
δ
I
(πδA)Fδ(π
δ
A) = F
′
δ(π
δ
A) (12)
and
νˆ ′
πδA,π
δ
I
(πδI )Fδ(π
δ
I ) + νˇ
′
πδA,π
δ
I
(πδI )Fδ(π
δ
A) = F
′
δ(π
δ
I ), (13)
which ensures that the value function F∗δ is C
1 on (0,1). Unlike the case with δ = 0 it is difficult
to obtain analytical results on the existence and uniqueness of such triggers, because of the highly non-
linear nature of Fδ. Secondly, while in the case with δ = 0we can prove sufficiency of the smooth-pasting
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Figure 10: Comparative statics for δ.
conditions, we could not obtain analytical results for δ > 0 (again because of the non-linear nature of
Fδ).
Another issue may arise in the case of delay. Consider the benchmark case from Table 2 with δ = .3.
Here we can ﬁnd thresholds that make F∗δ a C
1 function on (0,1): πδA = .4316 and π
δ
I = .5504. For
this case the smooth-pasting conditions are also sufficient. However, from Figure 11, which depicts Fδ
(dashed line) and F∗δ (solid line) on C, we can see that both coincide, even in the continuation region C.
This would suggest that, in this case, C = ∅ and, thus, that the optimal stopping time is τ∗δ = 0. Therefore,
starting the clinical trial is not optimal and one should make an adoption/abandonment decision straight
away. The intuition for this result is that, if the delay is long, one incurs sampling costs for a relatively
long time before any beneﬁt occurs. Since these beneﬁts are discounted more, the present value of the
sampling costs may outweigh the informational beneﬁt of observing trial results. It is then optimal not
to incur sampling costs at all. A full investigation of this issue, however, will have to await further
research.
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Figure 11: An example where the optimal stopping problem (11) where the continuation region
seems to be empty. The parameter values are taken as in Table 2, with δ = .3.
6 An Illustration: Standard vs Robot-Assisted Laparoscopic Prostate-
ctomy
In this section we apply our model to the choice between robot-assisted and standard laparoscopic
prostatectomy from the perspective of the UK national health service using data from a published
study by Close et al. (2013).11 Standard laparoscopic prostatectomy and robot-assisted laparo-
scopic prostatectomy are favoured over the open technique as these cause less bleeding and allow
for a quicker return to activities. Robot-assisted laparoscopic prostatectomy is increasingly used
compared to the standard technique. However, the high costs has led authorities to question the
value of robotic-assisted procedures to patients and the health care system.
The relevant data for an optimal trial/adoption/abandonment decision are given in Table 3.
These are used to compute the parameter values as given in Table 4. Here it has been assumed
that:
1. the number of patients treated every year will remain constant and the technology will be
used forever (to allow for straightforward computation of the discounted streams of beneﬁts
for the different scenarios);
2. the QALY level of robot-assisted laparoscopic prostatectomy is chosen such that this tech-
nique is just cost effective;
3. the total of 10,000 patients involved in the simulated trial over 10 years were spread uni-
formly over time in pairs;
11Note that Close et al. (2013) do not present the results of a clinical trial, but, rather, a simulation-based analysis.
We use the study mainly to provide a realistic background to illustrate our model.
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Description Parameter Source Value
Beneﬁt of standard prostatectomy (in QALY) QALY0 Close et al. 6.44
Value per QALY vQALY Claxton et al. £13,000
Cost of standard prostatectomy c0 Close et al. £7,628
Cost of robot-assisted prostatectomy c1 Close et al. £9,040
Beneﬁt of robot-assisted prostatectomy (if cost effective) QALY1 derived 7.63
Beneﬁt of robot-assisted prostatectomy (if not cost effective) QALY0 Close et al. 6.44
Patients treated per year patients Close et al. 5,464
Length of trial Close et al. 10 years
Patients treated in trial trial Close et al. 500
Table 3: Relevant trial/decision information for prostatectomy case.
4. the trial costs per patient are assumed to equal the cost difference between the two technolo-
gies with an added £500 for other costs;
5. the penalties for not adopting a superior technology (P and L) are set to zero;
6. the value per QALY is taken from Claxton et al. (2015).
For these values, the adoption and abandonment bounds are πI = .8882 and πA = .0064, re-
spectively. Note that the lower bound is close to zero because the trial is cheap to run relative to
the potential beneﬁts to be gained if the technology turns out to be superior. With a prior belief
of .5 in robot-assisted laparoscopic prostatectomy being cost effective, this implies that at the start
of the trial the probability of adoption (abandonment) is .5598 (.4402). The expected trial costs
are £110,600 and the expected duration of the trial is only .23 years. The value of the project at
the start of the trial is £15.07bn.
Figure 12 gives a histogram of decision times based on 5,000 simulated sample paths. The
right-hand panel gives decision times conditional on robot-assisted laparoscopic prostatectomy
being superior. On this event decisions are taken very quickly; in fact, all sample paths lead to
a decision within .085 years, i.e., after about a month. This happens because, if robot-assisted
laparoscopic prostatectomy is cost effective, then its QALY gain is so much larger than that of the
standard procedure that a clinical trial will pick up on this very quickly. In addition, all sample
paths lead to adoption of the technique. In other words, along no sample path does a Type I error
occur. The left-hand panel gives decision times conditional on robot-assisted laparoscopic prosta-
27
Parameter Description Derivation Value
B1 Beneﬁt if superior (Qaly1 · vQaly − c1) · patients/r £16.42bn
B0 Beneﬁt if not superior (Qaly0 · vQaly − c1) · patients/r £13.60bn
B Beneﬁt of current treatment (Qaly0 · vQaly − c0) · patients/r £13.86bn
I Sunk costs of adoption assumed £1mln
c Trial cost ﬂow (c1 − c0 +500) · trial £.38mln p.a.
r Discount rate Close et al. 3.5%
µ Trend if superior (Qaly1 −Qaly0) · vQaly · trial £3.10mln p.a.
σ Volatility of observations assumed £1.5mln p.a.
P Penalty of non-adoption during trial assumed 0
L Penalty of non-adoption after trial assumed 0
p Prior assumed .5
Table 4: Parameter values for laparoscopic prostatectomy case.
tectomy not leading to any superior health beneﬁts over the standard procedure. On this event
decisions are taken very late: clinical trials can (theoretically) last as long as 1,000 years. Unreal-
istic as this may seem, it is not unexpected. Due to the low costs of conducting the trial, the fairly
low number of patients involved per annum, and the high beneﬁts if the robot-assisted technique
turns out to be superior after all, it is optimal to keep the trial going. Finally, in the simulation,
87% of sample paths (conditional on θ = 0) end in an abandonment decision. This implies that
the (simulated) probability of a Type II error is 13%. Note that this performance is actually better
than the usually imposed error probabilities in frequentist studies. In fact, these error probabili-
ties can be computed exactly12 as α = .0056 and β = .1252, showing that our simulations are fairly
accurate.
By choosing the QALY value of robot-assisted laparoscopy such that the technology is just cost
effective we have biased the decision against adoption. Figure 13 shows a comparative statics
exercise for this QALY level. As can be seen the value of the project increases sharply in the QLAY
12This uses the fact that the bounds πI and πA can be written as likelihood ratio bounds ΛI and ΛA , respectively.
Since (Λt )t≥0 follows a GBM conditional on θ, with Λ0 = 1, Pθ − a.s., it can easily be derived that (see, for example,
Stokey, 2009):
Pθ(Λτ∗ = ΛI ) =
1−Λ1−2θA
Λ
1−2θ
I −Λ1−2θA
, and Pθ(Λτ∗ = ΛA) =
Λ
1−2θ
I − 1
Λ
1−2θ
I −Λ1−2θA
.
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Figure 12: Stopping time distribution.
level of robot-assisted laparoscopic prostatectomy (conditional on it being superior). Since this
QALY level only inﬂuences the parameter B it is no surprise to see similar comparative statics as
those in Section 4, Figure 6.
7 Concluding Remarks
The Bayesian model presented in this paper was motivated by a desire to bring together sequen-
tial hypothesis testing and real options analysis to inform decision making in health technology
assessment under irreversible costs. In a sequential setting, the decision maker is required to
simultaneously assess (i) whether enough statistical evidence has been gathered, and (ii) if the
newly proposed technology is deemed superior to the existing one.
The proposed framework deals with such requirements by specifying a decision rule that, be-
ing a function of the uncertain outcomes of a clinical trial as well as payoffs, produces inferential
bounds for abandonment or adoption of the new technology. At each point during the clinical
trial the Bayesian posterior process is assessed against an investment and an abandonment deci-
sion bound, indicating whether the trial should continue or not. When the trial stops, a decision
is taken, either for investment or abandonment, and it is ensured that health beneﬁts to the pop-
ulation are maximized.
The framework considers and combines dimensions that in present approaches are typically
studied in isolation. By putting health beneﬁts at the centre of the decision making process, and
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Figure 13: Comparative statics for the QALY level of robot-assisted laparoscopy.
by considering the value of gatheringmore evidence, the model explicitly incorporates: (i) the cost
and beneﬁts of delaying adoption/abandonment of a newly developed health-care technology, (ii)
discounted population payoffs, (iii) the costs of conducting further research, and (iv) the beneﬁts
of gathering further evidence at each point during the trial. As a result, the decision rule derived
in this paper is optimal (i) ex ante, (ii) at any time during the clinical trial, and (iii) at the time
an adoption/abandonment decision is made. Delays in observing health outcomes after a trial
can be incorporated and are shown to lower the value of the new technology, and to shrink the
inaction region. For longer delays, it is not entirely clear what the optimal decision is, although it
appears that an immediate decision might be required. A full investigation of this issue presents
an avenue for future research.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
1. Since (πt)t≥0 is a martingale, the optimal stopping problem (4) can be written as
F∗(π) = −
(
c
r
+π
P
r
)
+ supτEπ
[
e−rτmax
{
FI (πτ) +
c
r
+πτ
P
r
,FA(πτ) +
c
r
+πτ
P
r
}]
= −
(
c
r
+π
P
r
)
+ supτEπ
[
e−rτmax
{
πτ(B1 −B0 +P/r) +B0 +
c
r
− I ,B+ c
r
−πτ(L−P/r)
}]
= −
(
c
r
+π
P
r
)
+ supτEπ [e
−rτmax {GI (πτ),GA(πτ)}] ,
(A.1)
where
GI (π) = π(B1 −B0 +P/r) +B0 +
c
r
− I , and GA(π) = B+
c
r
−πτ(L−P/r).
Assumptions 1 and 2 ensure that GI and GA are increasing and non-increasing, respectively,
whereas Assumptions 3 and 4 ensure that GA(0) > GI (0) and GI (1) > GA(1). All these are nat-
ural assumptions. They imply that there is a unique point x¯ ∈ (0,1) such that GI (x¯) = GA(x¯). Note
that x¯ = π¯, cf. (3).
Deﬁne the function G : (0,1)→R by
G(π) = 1π≤π¯GA(π) + 1π>π¯GI (π).
Note that G = GA ∨GI and that G is C2 on (0,1) \ {π¯}.
2. From Peskir and Shiryaev (2006) it follows that we need to ﬁnd a function F∗ ∈ C1, with second
derivatives locally bounded, which dominates G on (0,1), and a set C ⊂ (0,1), that solve the free
boundary problem 
L F∗ − rF∗ = 0 on C, and L F∗ − rF∗ < 0 on (0,1) \ C
F∗ > G on C, and F∗ =G on (0,1) \ C
∂F∗
∂π |∂C =
∂G
∂π |∂C .
(A.2)
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Here L denotes the characteristic operator of (πt)t≥0, i.e., for any ϕ ∈ C2,
Lϕ(π) =
1
2
(µ
σ
)2
π2(1−π)2ϕ′′(π).
Note that the condition
L F∗ − rF∗ < 0 on (0,1) \ C,
is always satisﬁed since G′′ = 0 on (0,1) \ {π¯}. For (A.2) to make sense, we also need that G > 0. A
necessary and sufficient condition for this to hold is that G(π¯) > 0. The property follows from
GA(π¯) = B+
c
r
− π¯(L−P/r)
> π¯(L−P/r)
[
γ +1/2
π¯ +γ − 1/2 − 1
]
= π¯(L−P/r) 1− π¯
π¯ +γ − 1/2 ≥ 0,
where the strict inequality in the second line follows from Assumption 5 and the weak inequality
in the last line follows from Assumption 2 and the fact that γ > 1/2.
3. On (0,1), deﬁne the functions ϕˆ : (0,1)→R+ and ϕˇ : (0,1)→R+, by13
ϕˆ(π) =
√
π(1−π)
(
π
1−π
)γ
, and ϕˇ(π) =
√
π(1−π)
(
1−π
π
)γ
. (A.3)
Note that ϕˆ and ϕˇ are the increasing and decreasing solutions to the differential equation Lϕ −
rϕ = 0, respectively. So, any solution to Lϕ − rϕ = 0 is of the form
ϕ(π) = Aˆϕˆ(π) + Aˇϕˇ(π),
where Aˆ and Aˇ are arbitrary constants. Furthermore, it is easily obtained that
ϕˆ′(π) = ϕˆ(π)
1/2+γ −π
π(1−π) > 0, ϕˇ
′(π) = ϕˇ(π)
1/2−γ −π
π(1−π) < 0,
ϕˆ′′(π) = ϕˆ(π)
(1/2+γ −π)(γ − 1/2+π)−π(1−π)
π2(1−π)2 > 0,
and
ϕˇ′′(π) = ϕˇ(π)
(1/2−γ −π)(π − 1/2−γ )−π(1−π)
π2(1−π)2 > 0.
From this it is obtained that
ϕˇ′′(π)
ϕˆ′′(π)
=
ϕˇ(π)
ϕˆ(π)
=
(
1−π
π
)2γ
.
13The results in this part of the proof are standard and can be found in the literature, such as, for example, Borodin
and Salminen (2002). They are collected here for ease of reference.
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4. Fix πL ≤ π¯ and deﬁne the mapping π 7→ Vˇ (π;πL), by
Vˇ (π;πL) = Aˆ(πL)ϕˆ(π) + Aˇ(πL)ϕˇ(π), (A.4)
where the constants Aˆ(πL) and Aˇ(πL) are given by
Aˆ(πL) =
ϕˇ(πL)G
′
A(πL)− ϕˇ′(πL)GA(πL)
ϕˇ(πL)ϕˆ′(πL)− ϕˇ′(πL)ϕˆ(πL)
, and Aˇ(πL) =
ϕˆ′(πL)GA(πL)− ϕˆ(πL)G′A(πL)
ϕˇ(πL)ϕˆ′(πL)− ϕˇ′(πL)ϕˆ(πL)
. (A.5)
Note thatL Vˇ (π;πL)−rVˇ (π;πL) = 0 for allπ ∈ (0,1). In addition, the function Vˇ satisﬁes Vˇ (πL;πL) =
GA(πL) and Vˇ
′(πL;πL) = G′A(πL).
Condition 5 implies that
GA(π¯) = B+
c
r
− π¯(L−P/r) > π¯
 γ + 12
π¯ +γ − 12
− 1
(L−P/r) = 1− π¯
π¯ +γ − 12
π¯(L−P/r) > 0.
Since G′A ≤ 0, it, therefore, holds that Aˇ(πL) > 0 for all πL ≤ π¯.
The denominator of Aˆ(πL) (and thus Aˇ(πL)) does not change in πL.
14 Since condition 5 ensures
that GA(π¯) > 0,
15 it follows that,
∂Aˆ(πL)
∂πL
< 0, and
∂Aˇ(πL)
∂πL
> 0.
5. Condition 5 ensures that Aˆ(π¯) > 0. Therefore, π 7→ Vˇ (π; π¯) is a (strictly) convex function,
which satisﬁes Vˇ (·; π¯) → ∞ as π ↑ 1 or π ↓ 0. So, there is a unique point πH ∈ (π¯,1) such that
Vˇ ′(πH ; π¯) = G′I (πH ). Since Vˇ
′(π¯; π¯) = G′A(π¯) < 0, at πH it holds that Vˇ (πH ; π¯) < GI (πH ). Also, for π
large enough, it holds that Vˇ (π; π¯) > GI (π).
6. Since Aˆ(πL) decreases and Aˇ(πL) increases in πL, the mapping π 7→ Vˇ (π;πL) has the property
that for every π > πL it holds that ∂Vˇ (π;πL)/∂πL < 0. So, the point πH ∈ (π¯,1) where Vˇ ′(πH ;πL) =
G′I (πH ) is decreasing in πL, as is the value Vˇ (πH ;πL). Now decrease πL from π¯ to 0. There will be
a unique πA, with corresponding πI at which Vˇ (πI ;πA) =GI (πI ) and Vˇ
′(πI ;πA) = G′I (πI ).
7. The interval C = (πA,πI ) and the proposed function F∗ together solve the free-boundary prob-
lem (A.2). The fact that πA and πI are the unique triggers that make F
∗ a C1 function on (πA,πI )
follows by construction.
14It holds that ϕˇ(πL)ϕˆ
′(πL)− ϕˇ′(πL)ϕˆ(πL) = 2γ .
15Note that GA(π) > 0 ⇐⇒ B+c/rL−P/r > π. Since
γ+1/2
π+γ−1/2 > 1, it follows that Aˆ(πL) > 0 implies GA(πL) > 0.
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8. The proof that a solution to (A.2) is also a solution to the optimal stopping problem, i.e.,
that
G∗(π) := F∗(π) +
(
c
r
+π
P
r
)
= sup
τ
Eπ [e
−rτG(πτ)] =: sup
τ
Jτ(π),
is standard. Here we will sketch the main argument, for technical details see, e.g., Øksendal
(2010). Obviously, it holds that G∗(π) ≤ supτ Jτ(π). To prove the reverse inequality, take any
stopping time τ. It now holds that
G∗(π) = Eπ [e−rτG∗(πτ)]− Eπ
[∫ τ
0
e−rt(L − r)G∗(πt)dt
]
≥ Eπ [e−rτG∗(πτ)] ≥ Eπ [e−rτG(πτ)] = Jτ(π),
where the ﬁrst equality follows from Dynkin’s formula (Øksendal, 2010), the ﬁrst inequality
follows from LG∗ − rG∗ ≤ 0, and the second inequality follows from G∗ ≥ G. Hence, G∗(π) ≥
supτ J
τ(π).
9. Suppose that condition 5 is not satisﬁed. Then there exists a unique π∗ ∈ (0, π¯) for which
B+ c/r
L−P/r = π∗
γ +1/2
π∗ +γ − 1/2
.
Following previous arguments there also exists a unique π∗ such that
Vˇ ′(π∗;π∗) =G′I (π
∗).
Figure 14 illustrates the idea of the proof and from this ﬁgure it is clear that the condition needed
is that
Vˇ (π∗;π∗) ≤ GI (π∗).
If this condition is satisﬁed the arguments above go through unchanged.
B Proof of Proposition 2
Let τ∗ = inf{t ≥ |πt < (πA,πI )} be the unique solution to (A.1). The constants Aˆ(πA) and Aˇ(πA)
in (A.5) can be rewritten as
Aˇ(πA) =
πA(1−πA)
2γϕˇ(πA)
 12 +γ −πAπA(1−πA)GA(πA)−G′A(πA)
 , and
Aˆ(πA) =
πA(1−πA)
2γϕˆ(πA)
G′A(πA)− 12 −γ −πAπA(1−πA)GA(πA)
 ,
where ϕˆ and ϕˇ are as in (A.3), and GA is deﬁned in (A.1).
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Figure 14: The function π 7→ Vˇ (π;πL) for different values of πL.
The proof of Proposition 1 was based on the fact that the mapping π 7→ Vˇ (π;πL) is such that
Vˇ (πL;πL) = GA(πL) and Vˇ
′(πL;πL) = G′A(πL) for all πL ∈ (0, π¯). We could also have started by
deﬁning a mapping π 7→ Vˆ (π;πH ) with the property that Vˆ (πH ;πH ) = GI (πH ) and Vˆ ′(πH ;πH ) =
G′I (πH ) for all πH ∈ (π¯,1). It is easy to see that Vˆ is given by
Vˆ (π;πH ) = Bˆ(πI )ϕˆ(π) + Bˇ(πI )ϕˇ(π),
where
Bˇ(πI ) =
πI (1−πI )
2γϕˇ(πI )
 12 +γ −πIπI (1−πI )GI (πI )−G′I (πI )
 , and
Bˆ(πI ) =
πI (1−πI )
2γϕˆ(πI )
G′I (πI )− 12 −γ −πIπI (1−πI )GI (πI )
 .
Using a similar reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1 it holds that Bˆ > 0, Bˇ > 0, and Vˆ is
strictly convex.
Finally, note that at the unique solution (πA,πI ) to the optimal stopping problem (A.1) it holds
that
Vˆ (πA;πI ) = GA(πA), Vˆ
′(πA;πI ) = G′A(πA), Vˇ (πI ;πA) = GI (πI ), and Vˇ
′(πI ;πA) = G′I (πI ).
1. Consider a change in B (which shifts GA up). It holds that
dVˇ (πI ;πA)
dB
= −
1
2 −γ −πA
2γ
ϕˆ(πI )
ϕˆ(πA)
+
1
2 +γ −πA
2γ
ϕˇ(πI )
ϕˇ(πA)
> 0.
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Since dGI /dB = 0 this implies that Vˇ (πI ;πA) > GI (πI ) after an increase in B. This implies that πA
must be increased to re-establish optimality.
Since dVˆ (πA;πI )/dB = 0 and dGA/dB > 0, it holds that Vˆ (πA;πI ) < GA(πA) after an increase in
B. This implies that πI must be increased to re-establish optimality.
2. Consider a change in B1 (which shifts GI up and increases its slope). It holds that
dVˆ (πA;πI )
dB1
=
πI
2γ
[
(12 +γ )
ϕˆ(πA)
ϕˆ(πI )
+ (γ − 12 )
ϕˇ(πA)
ϕˇ(πI )
]
> 0.
Since dGA/dB1 = 0 this implies that Vˆ (πA;πI ) > GA(πA) after an increase in B1. This implies that
πI must be decreased to re-establish optimality.
Since dVˇ (πI ;πA)/dB1 = 0 and dGI /dB1 > 0, it holds that Vˇ (πI ;πA) < GI (πI ) after an increase in
B1. This implies that πA must be decreased to re-establish optimality.
3. Consider a change in c (which shifts both GA and GI up by the same amount). Since an increase
in c increases both Aˆ and Aˇ it strictly increases Vˇ ′′(π;πA), for all π. Since Vˇ is strictly convex and
GI is linear this implies that Vˇ (πI ;πA) > GI (πI ) after the change in c. To restore optimality πA has
to be increased.
Similarly, an increase in c increases both Bˆ and Bˇ, which strictly increases Vˆ ′′(π;πI ), for all π.
Since Vˆ is strictly convex and GA is linear this implies that Vˆ (πA;πI ) > GA(πA) after the change in
c. To restore optimality πI has to be decreased.
4. Consider a change in γ . Such a change affects Aˆ, Aˇ, Bˆ, Bˇ, ϕˆ, and ϕˇ. Direct computations
reveal that
∂ϕˆ(π)
∂γ
= ϕˆ(π) log
(
π
1−π
)
,
∂ϕˇ(π)
∂γ
= ϕˇ(π) log
(
1−π
π
)
,
∂Aˆ
∂γ
= Aˆ
[
log
(
1−πA
πA
)
− 1
γ
]
+
ϕˇ(πA)
2γ
GA(πA)
πA(1−πA)
,
and
∂Aˇ
∂γ
= Aˇ
[
log
(
πA
1−πA
)
− 1
γ
]
+
ϕˆ(πA)
2γ
GA(πA)
πA(1−πA)
.
It is then easily obtained that
∂Vˇ (πI ;πA)
∂γ
=
(
Aˆϕˆ(πI )− Aˇϕˇ(πI )
)
log
(
1−πA
πA
πI
1−πI
)
+
1
2γ
[
ϕˆ(πI )ϕˇ(πA) + ϕˇ(πI )ϕˆ(πA)
πA(1−πA)
GA(πA)− 2GI (πI )
]
.
(B.1)
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The ﬁrst term on the right-hand side is the product of two positive terms. [The logarithmic term
is positive because πA < 1/2 < πI . The term in round brackets is positive because differentiability
at πI gives that
Aˆϕˆ′(πI ) + Aˇϕˇ′(πI ) = G′I (πI ) > 0
⇐⇒ γ + (
1
2 −πI )
πI (1−πI )
Aˆϕˆ(πI ) +
−γ + (12 −πI )
πI (1−πI )
Aˇϕˇ(πI ) > 0
⇐⇒ Aˆϕˆ(πI ) >
γ − (12 −πI )
γ + (12 −πI )
Aˇϕˇ(πI ) > Aˇϕˇ(πI ),
(B.2)
where the ﬁnal inequality follows from πI > 1/2.]
The term between square brackets of (B.1) can be expanded as
ϕˆ(πI )ϕˇ(πA) + ϕˇ(πI )ϕˆ(πA)
πA(1−πA)
GA(πA)− 2GI (πI ) =
(
ϕˆ(πI )
ϕˆ(πA)
+
ϕˇ(πI )
ϕˇ(πA)
)
GA(πA)− 2GI(πI )
=
(
ϕˆ(πI )
ϕˆ(πA)
+
ϕˇ(πI )
ϕˇ(πA)
)(
Aˆϕˆ(πA) + Aˇϕˇ(πA)
)
− 2
(
Aˆϕˆ(πI ) + Aˇϕˇ(πI )
)
= Aˆ
ϕˆ(πA)ϕˇ(πI )− ϕˆ(πI )ϕˇ(πA)
ϕˇ(πA)
+ Aˇ
ϕˆ(πI )ϕˇ(πA)− ϕˆ(πA)ϕˇ(πI )
ϕˆ(πA)
= (ϕˆ(πA)ϕˇ(πI )− ϕˆ(πI )ϕˇ(πA))︸                              ︷︷                              ︸
<0
[
Aˆ
ϕˇ(πA)
− Aˇ
ϕˆ(πA)
]
=
ϕˆ(πA)ϕˇ(πI )− ϕˆ(πI )ϕˇ(πA)
ϕˇ(πA)ϕˆ(πA)
(
Aˆϕˆ(πA)− Aˇϕˇ(πA)
)
︸                   ︷︷                   ︸
<0
> 0,
where the last step follows from a similar procedure as in (B.2) and observing that G′A(πA) < 0.
So, in order to restore optimality after an increase in γ , the abandonment trigger πA must be
increased. A similar analysis shows that
∂Vˆ (πA;πI )
∂γ
> 0,
so that πI must be decreased after an increase in γ .
The ﬁnal two results now follow by observing that γ is increasing in σ and decreasing in µ.
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C Proof of Proposition 3
For all π ∈ (0,1), deﬁne
F(π) : = max(FA(π),FI (π)),
F∗δ(π) : = sup
τδ∈Tδ
Eπ
[
−
∫ τδ
0
e−rt(c +Pπt)dt + e−rτδF(πτδ )
]
, (C.1)
F˜δ(π) : = Eπ
[
−
∫ δ
0
e−rt(c +Pπt)dt + e−rδF(πδ)
]
,
and
F˜∗(π) : = sup
τ∈T0
Eπ
[
−
∫ τ
0
e−rt(c +Pπt)dt + e−rτF˜δ(πτ)
]
. (C.2)
From Øksendal and Sulem (2007, Proposition 2.11) it follows that F∗δ = F˜
∗ and that τ∗δ ∈ Tδ is an
optimal stopping time for (C.1) if, and only if, τ∗δ = τ
∗ + δ, where τ∗ ∈ T0 is an optimal stopping
time for (C.2).
It holds that
F˜δ(π) = Eπ
[
−
∫ δ
0
e−rt(c +Pπt)dt
]
+ e−rδEπ[F(πδ)]
= e−rδ
{
c +Pπ
r
+ Eπ
[
1πδ>π¯FI (πδ) + 1πδ<0π¯FA(πδ)
]}
= e−rδ
{
c +Pπ
r
+ (B1 −B0)Eπ[πδ1πδ>π¯]− LEπ[πδ1πδ>π¯]
+ (B0 − I )Pπ(πδ > π¯) +BPπ(πδ < π¯)
}
,
where the second equality follows because (πt)t≥0 is a martingale.
The expectations and probabilities in the last two lines of the above equation are derived in
the following lemma, the proof of which can be found in Appendix D.16
Lemma 1. Deﬁne
b± :=
σ
µ
√
δ
[
log
(
(1− π¯)π
π¯(1−π)
)
± 1
2
µ2
σ2
δ
]
and d± :=
σ
µ
√
δ
[
log
(
(1−π)π¯
π(1− π¯)
)
± 1
2
µ2
σ2
δ
]
,
and denote the cdf of the standard normal distribution by Φ. Then
Eπ
[
πδ1πδ<π¯
]
= πΦ(d−), Pπ (πδ < π¯) = πΦ(d−) + (1−π)Φ(d+),
Eπ
[
πδ1πδ>π¯
]
= πΦ(b+), and Pπ (πδ > π¯) = πΦ(b+) + (1−π)Φ(b−).
16We are grateful to Tomasz Zastawniak for his help in establish this proof.
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Therefore,
Fδ(π) = e
−rδ
{
c +Pπ
r
+ (B1 −B0)πΦ(b+)− LπΦ(d−)
+ (B0 − I )[πΦ(b+) + (1−π)Φ(b−)] +B[πΦ(d−) + (1−π)Φ(d+)]
}
.
Using the tower property, we can then write:
F∗δ(π) =sup
τ∈T0
Eπ
[
−
∫ τ
0
e−rt(c +Pπt)dt + e−rτFδ(πτ)
]
=− c +Pπ
r
+ sup
τ∈T0
Eπ [e
−rτFδ(πτ)] .
This is a standard optimal stopping problem of the form studied in Appendix A. Therefore,
the same conditions for optimality apply. That is, the state space, [0,1], can be spit into a con-
tinuation region C and a stopping region Γ := [0,1] \ C. As mentioned in Remark 6, the “smooth-
pasting” conditions (12) and (13) are necessary, but not sufficient. Sufficiency is provided by
superharmonicity of the value function. In the continuation region, superharmonicity follows by
construction. In the case of Proposition 1, superharmonicity on Γ follows straightforwardly from
the piece-wise linear nature of the function G. In the model with delay, however, this may not be
the case as we could not obtain an analytic veriﬁcation due to the highly non-linear nature of Fδ.
What we can say, though, is that, since17
limsupπ↓0
Fδ(π)
ϕˇ(π)
<∞, and limsupπ↑1
Fδ(π)
ϕˆ(π)
<∞,
it follows from Dayanik and Karatzas (2003, Proposition 5.14) that there exist no πL ∈ (0,1), nor
πH ∈ (0,1), such that (0,πL) ⊂ C or (πH ,1) ⊂ C. It appears that, in our numerical example reported
in Remark 6, we ﬁnd that, C = ∅ and, thus, that the optimal stopping time is τ∗ = 0. Whether this
is indeed the case will be left to future research. Suffice to say here that one has to be careful in
relying solely on smooth-pasting conditions.
D Proof of Lemma 1
1. Fix π ∈ (0,1) and consider the process (πt)t≥π0, with π0 = π, Pπ-a.s.. To simplify notation we will
drop the subscript π from now on. Consider a solution πt of the stochastic differential equation
(SDE)
dπt =
µ
σ
πt(1−πt)dWt ,
17It holds that Fδ(0) = e
−rδF(0) and Fδ(1) = e−rδF(1). In addition 1/ϕˇ→ 1 as π ↓ 0 and 1/ϕˆ→ 1 as π ↑ 1.
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whereWt is a standard Brownian motion under P. Deﬁne, for all t ≥ 0,
Zt := π0 exp
{∫ t
0
µ
σ
(1−πs)dWs −
1
2
∫ t
0
µ2
σ2
(1−πs)2ds
}
.
It then follows from Ito’s lemma that Zt follows the SDE
dZt = Zt
[
µ
σ
(1−πt)dWt −
1
2
µ2
σ2
(1−πt)2dt
]
+
1
2
Zt
µ2
σ2
(1−πt)2dt
=
µ
σ
Zt(1−πt)dWt ,
with Z0 = π0. Because of uniqueness of solutions to SDEs, it holds that Zt = πt , P-a.s.. Therefore,
it holds that
πt = π0 exp
{∫ t
0
µ
σ
(1−πs)dWs −
1
2
∫ t
0
µ2
σ2
(1−πs)2ds
}
.
Now deﬁne an equivalent measure Q, by the Radon-Nikodym derivative
dQ
dP
= exp
{∫ t
0
µ
σ
(1−πs)dWs −
1
2
∫ t
0
µ2
σ2
(1−πs)2ds
}
=
πt
π0
,
and let
Bt :=Wt −
∫ t
0
µ
σ
(1−πs)ds.
It then follows from the Girsanov theorem that Bt is a standard Brownian motion under Q.
2. It, therefore, holds that
EP[πδ1πδ<π¯] = π0EP
[
πt
π0
1πδ<π¯
]
= π0EP
[
dQ
dP
1πδ<π¯
]
= π0EQ[1πδ<π¯] =Q(1πδ<π¯).
Note that
dπt =
µ
σ
πt(1−πt)dBt +
µ2
σ2
πt(1−πt)2dt,
so that an application of Ito’s lemma gives
d log
(
πt
1−πt
)
= d log(πt)− d log(1−πt)
=
1
πt
dπt −
1
2
1
π2t
dπtdπt +
1
1−πt
dπt +
1
(1−πt)2
dπtdπt
=
1
2
µ2
σ2
dt +
µ
σ
dBt .
Therefore,
log
(
πt
1−πt
)
= log
(
π0
1−π0
)
+
1
2
µ2
σ2
t +
µ
σ
Bt .
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It then immediately follows that
πt
1−πt
=
π0
1−π0
exp
{
1
2
µ2
σ2
t +
µ
σ
Bt
}
,
and, thus, that
πδ < π¯ ⇐⇒
Bδ√
δ
<
log
π¯(1−π0)
(1−π¯)π0 −
1
2
µ2
σ2
δ
(µ/σ)
√
δ
.
Since Bt is a Brownian motion under Q, it now follows that
EP
[
πδ1πδ<π¯
]
= π0Q(1πδ<π¯) = π0Φ

log
π¯(1−π0)
(1−π¯)π0 −
1
2
µ2
σ2
δ
(µ/σ)
√
δ
 .
3. Using the same Radon-Nikodym derivative as before and applying the Girsanov theorem, we
can write
P(πδ < π¯) = E[1πδ < π¯] = π0EQ
[
1
πδ
1πδ<π¯
]
.
This expectation can be computed explicitly in the following steps, which only use straight-
forward algebra:
π0EQ
[
1
πδ
1πδ<π¯
]
= π0EQ
1−π0 +π0e
1
2
µ2
σ2
δ+
µ
σ Bδ
π0e
1
2
µ2
σ2
δ+
µ
σ Bδ
1
Bδ<
σ
µ
(
π¯(1−π0)
(1−π¯)π0 −
1
2
µ2
σ2
δ
)

= (1−π0)EQ
e−12 µ2σ2 δ− µσ Bδ1Bδ< σµ ( π¯(1−π0)(1−π¯)π0 − 12 µ2σ2 δ)
+π0EQ
[
1
Bδ<
σ
µ
(
π¯(1−π0)
(1−π¯)π0 −
1
2
µ2
σ2
δ
)]
= (1−π0)
∫ σ
µ
(
π¯(1−π0)
(1−π¯)π0 −
1
2
µ2
σ2
δ
)
−∞
e
−12
µ2
σ2
δ− µσ s 1√
2πt
e−s
2/2tds +π0Φ
(
σ
µ
(
π¯(1−π0)
(1− π¯)π0
− 1
2
µ2
σ2
δ
))
= (1−π0)
∫ π¯(1−π0)(1−π¯)π0 + 12 µ2σ2 δ
(µ/σ)
√
δ
−∞
1√
2π
e−z
2/2dz +π0Φ
(
σ
µ
(
π¯(1−π0)
(1− π¯)π0
− 1
2
µ2
σ2
δ
))
= π0Φ(d−) + (1−π0)Φ(d+).
4. A similar analysis gives the results for EP
[
πδ1πδ>π¯
]
and P(πδ > π¯).
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